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Three newly established public agencies built regional rail
projects in Los Angeles County from 1978 to 2002. The
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission, the Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the
Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority were experiments in regional governance. Conventional understanding of these agencies only partially explains their successes
and failures. One path to improved understanding is
to combine research on the politics of designing new
public agencies with research on cooperation in collective action problems. What emerges is an untold story
of American politics: the evolution of mechanisms that
promote cooperation. Four ﬁndings emerge: (1) conﬂict
is inevitable; (2) public agencies can succeed despite the
problems of politics; (3) successful regional solutions are
intensely local; and (4) cooperation emerges from supplyside mechanisms that create new resources rather than
reallocate existing resources. The limits of politics
are neither random nor predestined—neither is the
governance solution.

emerges from what otherwise might appear to be a
chaotic set of events described by former Los Angeles
deputy mayor Ray Remy (1998) as “the failure of
public administration in virtually every test.” The
cases of the regional transportation agencies invite
inquiry into two ongoing controversies regarding
institutions and organizations: improving the understanding of both “the life course of institutions” and the
“relation between institutional and organizational
processes” (Scott 1995, 146–47). In light of the emerging interest in researching governance (Hill and Lynn
2005, 155) and with a view of governance as the
study of “coordination and collaboration” (Heinrich,
Hill, and Lynn 2004, 5), as well as the potential
beneﬁts of “cooperation and competition” (Feiock
2004, 4), these cases examine governance as a product
of institutional design that attempts to facilitate the
beneﬁts of coordination and collaboration in a political environment with intense competition among
local governments for funding.

T

The three newly established
he future of the Los Angeagencies that oversaw the reles region was sketched on
The future of the Los Angeles
a cocktail napkin in the
region was sketched on a cock- gional projects were nothing
lounge of the downtown New
tail napkin in the lounge of the less than experiments in governance, designed to overcome
Otani hotel in 1978. Over dinner,
downtown New Otani hotel in long-standing political constaﬀ from the newly formed Los
1978. … The participants [in
ﬂicts. These agencies were
Angeles County Transportation
Commission drew rail corridors for the exercise] drew on a vision of building a transportation infrastructure for one of the world’s
a proposed ballot measure to ingovernance in which regional
crease the sales tax for 8 million
cooperation would emerge out largest and most demographically diverse metropolitan areas
residents countywide. In retroof a collision with competing
to carry it into the 21st censpect, the meeting initiated a twopolitical constituencies.
tury. These three cases are the
decade departure from government
story of a search for resources
to governance. The participants
totaling more than $12 billion in
drew on a vision of governance in
local, state, federal, and private funding where previwhich regional cooperation would emerge out of a
ously there had been no money.
collision with competing political constituencies.
In a little over a decade, the promise of a regional rail
system collapsed as interest group conﬂict overwhelmed the fragile cooperative mechanisms of governance. Upon careful examination, however, a pattern
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What emerges is an untold story of American
politics: the evolution of mechanisms that promote
cooperation among political entities and how these
mechanisms succeed or fail. Four major ﬁndings

emerge: (1) conﬂict is inevitable; (2) public agencies
can overcome the interest group conﬂict that is inherent in politics; (3) successful regional solutions are
intensely local; and (4) governance needs to address
two parts of the political equation—the demand side
and the supply side.
The regional transportation agencies, created between
1978 and 1992, responded to the predictable challenges
of building regional projects in a politically fragmented region. The degree to which the cooperative
mechanisms developed by each agency succeeded or
failed helps explain what long-serving Los Angeles
County supervisor Ed Edelman (2001) described as
“Mayor Bradley putting together a consensus” and
what the mayor’s transportation board appointee
Ray Remy (1998) characterized as the “meltdown of
critical consensus.” This invites the research question:
Can governance emerge in a politically fragmented
environment?
The Limits of Current Understanding
The conventional understanding of these projects
suggests a wide range of causes for failure. Ineﬀective
executive directors, ﬁscal oﬃcers who overestimated
revenues, incompetent project managers, and overly
inﬂuential contractors begin the list of explanations
for their shortcomings. The impact of local politicians on selecting rail lines, succumbing to symbolic
actions, and appointing alternates instead of serving
themselves add to the litany of proposed shortcomings. The inevitability of cost overruns on federally
funded new-start rail construction, the uncertainty
of clearing federal and state environmental review
processes, insuﬃcient employment densities, and
organizational fragmentation extend the list of
potential explanations.
Making explicit the intrinsic problems of political
design potentially addresses a contemporary critique
of the ﬁeld of public administration, that is, its perceived inattention to interesting questions of politics,
institutions, and public organizations (March 1997;
Moe 1994, 17; Wilson 1994). Research in public
administration has inadequately advanced the study
of complex institutional arrangements in American
metropolitan regions (Ostrom 1998, 15). “If institutions matter, then which institutions are employed
becomes a paramount concern. In particular, the
selection, survival, adaptation, and evolution of institutional practices need to be understood” (Shepsle
1986, 52). In addition, there is a need to explain the
how and why of institutional change in local government (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001, 6).
What remain a puzzle are the underlying causes of
the conventional set of problems and an understanding of the features of successful cooperation. A more
systematic, theory-driven study is needed to explain

the design and evolution of governance in politically
complex environments.
Methodology: Case Study Analysis
The cases were selected according to three criteria:
(1) a shared organizational ﬁeld (Scott 1995, 56) of
transportation; (2) shared geography and demographics of the region of Los Angeles County; and
(3) shared responsibility for several billion dollars in
capital project costs. These criteria permit a focus on
the speciﬁcs of institutional development and address
such variables as ﬁeld, location, and costs. The limits
of these criteria caution against generalizing the
ﬁndings beyond the ﬁeld of transportation or the
metropolitan region of Los Angeles County.
A case study approach is favored when seeking to
explain the how and why of an issue (Yin 1994, 9), as
well as when exploring institutional process questions
(Scott 1995, 146). The focus on three organizations
permits a comparison among diﬀerent cases and
analysis that builds on shared ﬁndings. After a brief
introduction of each case, the subsequent presentation
is organized around key themes rather than the chronology of each case. This approach allows comparisons
and contrasts across major ﬁndings.
For this research, four primary sources of information
were used: (1) interviews with key decision makers
who were elected oﬃcials, board members, and agency
executives; (2) public documents from federal, state,
and local agencies; (3) journal articles and books
researching the speciﬁcs of the Los Angeles region,
particularly transportation; and (4) contemporary
newspaper articles.
The interviews with participants focused on their
perceptions of seminal events and mechanisms. The
limitations of individual perceptions and recollections
of events call for the use of additional sources of information and introduce the risk of selection basis in
choosing interviewees. However, the narratives
provided by those interviewed provide an opportunity
to “explore speciﬁc phenomena, such as leadership
and organizational change” (Ospina and Dodge 2005,
143). The use of multiple sources addresses Yin’s
(1994, 92) suggestion on the comparative advantage
of using multiple sources of information to develop
“converging lines of inquiry.”
The Three Cases: An Overview

The Los Angeles County Transportation Commission
(LACTC) oﬀers a case study in politics designing conﬂict
into the structure of an agency from the start. The creation of the LACTC in 1976 was seen as partly the result
of repeated failures by the Southern California Rapid
Transportation District (RTD) to secure new-start rail
construction funding for a rail system from the federal
government. The legislative enactment of the LACTC
The Collision of Politics and Cooperation 291

was intended, in the words of legislative staﬀ member D.
J. Smith (2000), to allow the LACTC to “wrestle control” of transportation policy making from two existing
regional agencies: the RTD and the Southern California
Association of Governments. The LACTC became
responsible for receiving 1978 Proposition A funds, a
measure that created a local half-cent sales tax to ﬁnance
regional rail construction, providing a share to the RTD
for subway construction and bus operations and allocating much of the remaining funds for construction
of LACTC’s light rail lines.
This arrangement left the region with two parallel
transportation agencies, the RTD and LACTC, each
in charge of massive public works construction projects. Both relied on a mixture of federal, state, and
local funds, and both had nearly identical elected
oﬃcials appointing their representatives to serve on
their boards of directors, though the agencies diverged
wildly in their policy choices, as noted by longtime
board member Marvin Holen (1997) and former
LACTC executive director Neil Peterson (2000).
Starting in the mid-1980s, a series of eﬀorts began
to consolidate the agencies.
The second case study begins in 1992, when the RTD
and LACTC were merged though legislation sponsored by Los Angeles–area state senator Richard Katz.
As a result, the largest public works project in the
United States became the responsibility of a newly
created agency, the Metropolitan Transit Agency
(MTA). The MTA is a case study in the breakdown of
the promise to build all the lines drawn on the napkin
in the New Otani hotel and promised to the 8 million
residents of Los Angeles County.
According to Katz (2000), the goals of the merger
were to improve accountability and to reduce conﬂict
between agencies in order to improve transit agency
performance in Los Angeles, both in bus operations
and rail construction. However, by 1998, the MTA
had exhausted the available funding, precluding the
construction of future lines. As prominent California
historian Kevin Starr has noted, the funding looked
like “Ponzi schemes the MTA had ﬁnanced itself ”
(2004, 556). According to an analysis conducted by
the former controller of the RTD, “Every MTA rail
project has had signiﬁcant cost overruns, with some
ﬁnal costs running as high as four to six times the
original planning estimates” (Rubin, Moore, and
Lee 1999, 198).
The recurrence of challenges in accountability led the
legislative sponsor of the consolidated MTA to
suggest—less than a decade later—that the new
agency be broken up (Katz 2000). Similarly, the
California Transportation Commission suggested in
its 1998 annual report, “The root of the problem may
lie in the MTA’s governing structure, which combines
292
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the function of a regional planning and funding
agency with the function of a transit operating and
construction agency” (1999, I-149).
The third agency, The Alameda Corridor Transportation Authority (ACTA), oﬀers a study in board
members seeking political control of expenditures.
The evolution of the agency reﬂects a movement
toward political control in order to reduce the uncertainty of local politics in ﬁnancing rail construction. The Alameda Corridor project evolved from
an advisory committee formed in 1980 by the
Southern California Association of Governments
that studied the movement of cargo from the harbors
of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The advisory committee’s report led to funding for highway improvements and additional study of options for improving
the freight-rail line transporting cargo from the
Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles to downtown
and nearby rail yards.
After a feasibility study was conducted, the ACTA
was created as a new authority to complete the
design, capture the needed funding, and build the
project. A joint powers agreement between the Port
of Los Angeles, the Port of Long Beach, and the six
municipalities that the proposed rail-cargo line
would run through created the Alameda Corridor
project. The ACTA’s governing structure evolved
signiﬁcantly over the course of the project, eventually revoking representation from any municipal
jurisdiction that did not contribute ﬁnancially to the
construction. The ACTA’s governance structure
evolved in response to the need to use public and
private sector funding and debt issuance to create a
structure that could credibly deliver the promised
project on time and on budget.
An Institutional Framework for Case Analysis:
Politics and Cooperation

The state and local elected oﬃcials who designed each
of the three agencies—the LACTC, MTA, and
ACTA—were well versed in politics. The politics
included choices about representation on the governing boards, the agencies’ respective missions, and the
authority provided to each agency. The evolution of
each agency reveals the impact of politics.
The impact of political considerations on the design
of new public agencies is central to the framework
that Terry Moe calls the politics of structural choice.
Moe starts with the premise that public agencies are
not designed to be eﬃcient: “Because American
politics is unavoidably a process of compromise,
then, public agencies will tend to be structured in part
by their enemies—who want them to fail” (1990a,
230). The fundamental diﬀerence of this approach
from other institutional approaches is that the failure
of public organizations is not incidental but deliber-

ate—it is the product of politically rational calculations (Schlager and Blomquist 1996). As institutional
scholar Richard Scott has noted, these organizational
designs are “rationally constructed ediﬁces established
by individuals seeking to promote or protect their
interests” (1995, 27). For rational reasons, an agency
might not be designed to serve the public interest in
complex settings of uncertainty, incomplete information, and opportunism (Zegart 1996). New agencies
have features that emerge from the interplay of
interest groups involved in the negotiations over
design (Moe 1990b, 143).
Moe’s framework seeks parsimony to explain the
design of public agencies through a few key features.
The ﬁve predominant features of politics-sustaining
competition can be summarized as follows: (1) majority rule is inherently unstable, making durable agreements very diﬃcult and opportunism potentially
strong (Shepsle and Weingast 1995); (2) the precarious nature of majority rule creates incentives for the
current majority to insulate newly formed agencies
from subsequent politics, limiting their responsiveness
to future majorities (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast
1989, 443); (3) the need for compromise in American
democracy typically necessitates support from opponents, structuring interest group conﬂict into an
agency without procedures for resolving disagreements; (4) the coercive nature of public authority
causes citizens and opponents of newly formed
agencies to protect themselves from the exercise of this
power (Moe 1991, 123), a long-standing challenge of
democracy (Miller 2000, 289); and (5) long-term
political uncertainty places a premium on trying to
anticipate future contingencies prior to available
information (Shepsle and Weingast 1995, 23).
Suggestions about mechanisms for cooperation in the
context of multiple and equal participants, as exists in
the fragmentation of authority in the Los Angeles
cases, can be found in the research literature on selfgovernance of common-pool resources. In explaining
the conditions needed to create and sustain voluntary
cooperation, this research examines the evolution of
rules, the processes for structuring those rules, the
mechanisms for enforcing agreed-upon rules, and the
sanctions for infractions (Blomquist 1992, xiii).
Moreover, the institutional analysis in this tradition is
particularly sensitive to context and the patterns of
interactions in complex relationships (Carlsson 2000).
The framework of common-pool resources research is
not typically applied to the production of public
goods, such as rail transit, because those goods are not
seen as possessing the required attributes of exclusion
and subtractability (Tang 1992, 4). However, shifting
the unit of analysis from individual users to competing political jurisdictions that want to share in a common funding resource—in this case, a countywide

dedicated sales tax—provides a case that is analogous
to the common-pool resource problem. Overproduction by one or several municipalities could leave no
transit resources for other municipalities.
The focus on resource-allocation decisions in commonpool resource research helps explain the evolution of
mechanisms that sustain cooperation (Ostrom 1990).
The ﬁve predominant features of self-organized
cooperation can be summarized as follows: (1) adaptation, whereby agencies rely on local autonomy to craft
solutions, with signiﬁcant participation from all
appropriators; (2) credible commitment, with an
expectation among participants that any commitment
to future allocations will be honored; (3) conﬂict
resolution, with grievance processes that respond to
allocation, equity, enforcement, and other concerns
among all those sharing the resource; (4) credible
enforcement, which prevents overappropriation by
any one user or group of users and the depletion of
shared resources; and (5) eﬀective monitoring of the
resources with an agreed-upon, neutral source of
reliable information.
A rich set of ﬁndings has converged to explain political institutions. Politics of structural choice theory
takes these and ﬁnds a variant of the Hobbesian world
of politics: “nasty” and “brutish” but not short.
Likewise, well-developed research on social dilemmas
can be seen as suggesting “a world of possibilities
rather than necessity” (Ostrom 1998, 16). The connection of the two sets of ﬁndings better explains both
sides of the same coin of collective action problems:
the demand side of Hobbesian failures and the supply
side of successes without the intervention of a Leviathan. The application of these two frameworks anticipates what otherwise appears to be a random set of
events.
Hypotheses: Testing a Framework of Governance

Four hypotheses provide empirical tests to determine
whether the performance limitations found in the
politics of structural choice research can be overcome
by the cooperative mechanisms found in commonpool resource research.
H1: Sustained project control depends on mechanisms to solve the instability of majority rule
by providing for local adaptation.
H2: Accountability derives from reducing
agency insulation from politics while providing
mechanisms for credible commitment.
H3: Conﬂict is built into regional agencies by
political design.
H4: Agency authority needs coercive power in
order to increase resources while developing
The Collision of Politics and Cooperation 293

agreed-upon sanctions to prevent
overappropriation.
Application of the Hypotheses to the Cases

Sustained project control depends on mechanisms to
solve the instability of majority rule by providing for
local adaptation (hypothesis 1). In the ﬁrst case study,
the LACTC’s passage of the countywide sales tax
addressed the instability of majority rule. The seminal
event early in the agency’s existence, the sales tax
measure, did not have a sunset clause, making it
unique in the state of California. The LACTC’s
success in passing the measure, particularly when
contrasted with repeated failures by its predecessor
agency, legally provided sustained project control over
both the light rail and heavy rail projects by generating a local revenue source. In addition to the absence
of a sunset clause, a second notable feature of the
Proposition A measure stands out: It addressed speciﬁc local conditions. Bus riders received a transit fare
subsidy. Rail construction received a guaranteed funding stream. Each of the more than 60 municipalities
in the county received a “local return” portion for
transit-related projects, broadly deﬁned. The revenue
from the LACTC’s Proposition A sales tax ballot
measure was adapted to very speciﬁc local conditions.
The second case study illustrates how an agency—the
MTA, which inherited the Proposition A funding—
found a solution to the problem of the instability of
majority rule. The challenge that the MTA faced in
sustaining control of rail construction funding derived
partly from the expectations encouraged by the promises of Proposition A. The promise of new rail transit
lines that would be accessible to neighborhoods
throughout Los Angeles County was diﬃcult to fulﬁll.
The decade between the passage of Proposition A in
1978 and the merger of the LACTC and RTD to
form the MTA saw the near completion of only two
light rail lines and one segment of the downtown
subway. These projects represented only a small
portion of the proposed routes presented to voters in
1978 on the Proposition A ballot map.
Moreover, after the expiration of the fare subsidies,
the MTA, as the successor to the RTD, needed to
address the expectations of bus riders served by the
MTA. Though not formally the result of a vote, the
success of the bus riders in pressing for the consent
decree to set aside funding for higher levels of bus
service can be seen as an extension of the majority rule
process, through which powerful constituencies can
overturn previously agreed-upon deals.
The third case study provides an enduring and stark
solution to the vicissitudes of the democratic process.
The major funders of the ACTA—the Ports of Los
Angeles and Long Beach—gained control of the
governing body and prevailed in court. Removing the
294
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six mid-corridor city representatives from the joint
powers authority solved the threat of instability posed
by majority rule by eliminating the municipal coalition that opposed the cities of Los Angeles and Long
Beach and their port representatives. However, while
insulating the joint powers authority from the instability of majority rule, the ACTA still provided for
local adaptation. Speciﬁcally, the authority negotiated
two types of detailed, legal agreements with each of
the mid-corridor cities: (1) a memorandum of understanding for speciﬁc transportation-related improvements in each jurisdiction at a speciﬁc funding level,
and (2) a memorandum of understanding that assured
timely construction permitting by each municipality.
These two types of legally binding memoranda
addressed very local needs and expectations of the
cities where the rail trench would be located.
Accountability derives from reducing agency insulation from politics while providing mechanisms for
credible commitment (hypothesis 2). The quest for
accountability can be seen in the evolution of the
legislation that created both the LACTC and MTA.
Though enacted more than a decade apart, both bills
initially had language requiring elected oﬃcials, appointed as principals, to attend board meetings, allowing for no alternates.
The case of the LACTC illustrates the impact of the
absence of mechanisms for accountability. Noticeably
absent in the construction of Proposition A were features to ensure that the promised rail projects would be
built. Longtime RTD board member and former
chairman Marvin Holen (1997) notes that in addition
to pressing the RTD for accountability in its spending
on the downtown subway and bus operations, the
LACTC’s 30-year plan further extended the time
horizon and leveraged funding sources, but it did not
address the fundamental diﬃculty of allocating resources among competing claims. In many ways, Proposition A and the LACTC’s plan mirrored the
approach that William Blomquist’s (1992) extensive
study of Los Angeles region water basins terms the
“California solution.” Blomquist found a repeated set
of choices to create more common-pool resources,
injecting river water into water basins rather than
battling the overallocation of existing resources. For
the LACTC, the California solution succeeded to the
extent that the LACTC avoided accountability mechanisms for ensuring that all promises for rail construction could be met.
The LACTC also did not succeed at insulating the
agency from future legislative changes. Rather, a major
impetus for the abolition of the LACTC resulted from
legislative concern over its lack of accountability. The
success of the California solution, with promises of
resources to competing expropriators, came at the
price of credible commitment. Ultimately, the cost of

the missing accountability mechanisms was the existence of the
agency itself. The merger of the
LACTC and the RTD was driven
by a search for better ways of ensuring public accountability for spending public funds.

The success of the California
solution, with promises of resources to competing expropriators, came at the price of
credible commitment.
Ultimately, the cost of the missing accountability mechanisms
was the existence of the agency
itself.

and to realistically project
future revenue streams (the
supply side). The ability to sell
the required bonds reﬂected
the ACTA’s success in developing mechanisms for accountability through the voting
structure, agreeing on detailed
memoranda of understanding
with aﬀected cities, and using
design and build project contracts. These mechanisms
provided accountability that
translated into successful funding.

The cost of accountability was a bill
that was ultimately paid by the
successor agency, the MTA. The
agency had diﬃculty sustaining the
promises of the LACTC’s 30-year
plan and scaled back the time frame
for construction and deliverables in an attempt to
address the expectation of increased accountability.
Conﬂict is built into regional agencies by political
The hiring of a fourth director, Julian Burke, in the
design (hypothesis 3). Conﬂict emerges as a dominant
third year of the agency’s existence was the result of
feature in each of the case studies. The interest groups
ongoing problems in resource allocavary in each of the cases, but
tion. In assuming the helm of the
conﬂict is ever-present. From
MTA, Burke (2001) stated that he
the onset, each agency had
From the onset, each agency
recognized agency credibility as the
signiﬁcant conﬂict structured
had signiﬁcant conﬂict struckey problem. According to Burke,
into it. Rather than resolving
tured into it. Rather than rethe imposition of a moratorium on
preexisting conﬂicts, the fornew rail construction sought to
solving preexisting conﬂicts, the mation of these new agencies
resolve the impossibility of satisfyformation of these new agencies initially confronted increasing
ing the four concurrent commitinitially confronted increasing levels of conﬂict among comments of the MTA to fund separate
peting interests. The legislative
levels of conﬂict among comrail construction projects as its ﬁrst
sponsor, Richard Katz (2000),
peting interests.
priority. The halt on commitments
and staﬀ member Caprice
to new rail construction became a
Young (2001) both noted that
mechanism for restoring credible
the level of conﬂict in one of the
commitment with federal and state funding agencies.
new agencies—the MTA—ran much deeper than ever
In addition, the moratorium stressed the priority of
imagined. The evolution of mechanisms to resolve
ensuring the agency’s accountability.
conﬂict varied among the agencies. The cases illustrate
the results of unchecked conﬂict and the utility of
The case study of the ACTA shows a preoccupation
mechanisms to resolve conﬂict.
with accountability in the formation of the agency as
a joint powers authority. The joint powers authority
The LACTC was literally created to wrest control of
form of governance limited participation to jurisdicplanning and building rail lines from the existing
tions that were directly aﬀected by the rail construcagencies. The minimal conﬂict that arose in choosing
tion. Moreover, the agency eventually excluded six
the initially constructed Blue Line resulted from
municipal jurisdictions with construction traversing
the alignment of three one-time features: (1) the
their downtowns. Unlike the other two case studies,
initial availability of an abundance of funds from
the ACTA evolved mechanisms giving Long Beach
Proposition A and initial low-cost construction
and Los Angeles city and port representatives sole
estimates; (2) an apparent consensus on the logic of
authority to approve appropriations.
connecting the two largest urban areas of the county,
downtown Los Angeles and Long Beach (Richmond
For the ACTA, accountability emerged as a dominant 2000); and (3) the political clout of those supporting
theme because of its innovative ﬁnancing mechathe line selection. However, the success of Proposition
nisms, which were dependent on the sale of bonds.
A at initially avoiding conﬂict through the promise of
Investors expected a project with strict ﬁnancial and
resources for everyone also deferred the need to deconstruction accountability. In order to guarantee a
velop mechanisms for resolving grievances. Again, the
suﬃcient revenue stream to service the debt, the
success of the California solution for the LACTC also
ACTA connected the demand side for construction to contained the elements of the agency’s eventual
the supply side of funding. The ACTA required
downfall.
majority approval by the jurisdictions that were
responsible for repayment of the debt; this created
Noticeably absent in the LACTC were mechanisms to
strong incentives to contain costs (the demand side)
resolve two virulent types of conﬂict: demographic
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and interagency conﬂict. Because of the Proposition A
map, residents in various regions of the county had
diﬀerent expectations of the new rail lines. The realities of the line-selection process, construction costs,
and staﬃng requirements made the construction of all
the promised lines impossible. Former undersecretary
of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Mortimer
Downey (2001), noted at the time that overexpenditures were not atypical for new-start rail construction
throughout the country (GAO 1998).
As the successor agency, the MTA had no mechanisms
in place to anticipate or successfully resolve conﬂict.
The merger of the two agencies was seen as one means
of resolving their diﬀerences. The most noticeable
evidence of the failure of mechanisms for allocation
decisions led to bus rider discontent, a long-standing
RTD concern, according to board member Marvin
Holen (1997) and former executive staﬀ member
Ralph De La Cruz (2001). Competition both within
and outside the agency between advocates of rail
construction funding and advocates of bus operations
funding prevented the establishment of a procedure
for resolving their diﬀerences. Rather, the courtsupervised consent decree requiring levels of bus
funding emerged in the absence of any
MTA-managed process.
In the ACTA case, the governance model initially
included conﬂict among those paying for the project,
the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and the six
mid-corridor cities through which the rail lines would
be built. Only after the cities of Los Angeles and Long
Beach prevailed in a court battle to remove the other
six cites and detailed agreements were reached on
improvement funding in each excluded city did the
conﬂict end.
Agency authority needs coercive power to increase
resources while developing agreed-upon sanctions to
prevent overappropriation (hypothesis 4). The problem of spending more than was appropriated became
paramount. Matching the projected revenue stream to
the projects for each agency challenged the leadership
in all three cases. The concept of sanctions from
common-pool resource management research helps
explain how this problem was overcome. The three
cases illustrate the evolution of varied approaches to a
similar problem.
The LACTC case study demonstrates the limits of
promising increased appropriations to meet each of
the competing needs. The LACTC’s evolution is
notable for its absence of mechanisms to prevent
overappropriation of resources. Through Proposition
A, the agency succeeded in gaining coercive public
authority—in this case, sales tax authority—to
increase appropriations. In creating the new resource,
the LACTC did not develop mechanisms to prevent
296
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early expropriators from exceeding initially agreedupon limits. The escalating cost of the initial LACTC
rail line from downtown Los Angeles to Long Beach
not only resulted from additional construction items
but also the absence of any agreed-upon sanctions for
expropriators. Rather than reduce ﬁnancial commitments, the executive director, Neil Peterson (2001),
used the 30-year plan to deliberately leverage additional funding though bond ﬁnancing, borrowing
against future sales tax revenues. In the absence of
local mechanisms to prevent the initial projects from
exhausting the common resource of sales tax revenues,
legislation was passed to set aside funding for the
San Fernando Valley.
The case of the MTA illustrates the results of deferring
sanctions for expropriators. All new projects were
placed on hold. This action addressed future construction but did not lead to sanctions against the beneﬁciaries of overappropriations. But the moratorium did
begin a process that connected allocations to available
current resources.
However, the limits of the moratorium in preventing
excess appropriations can be seen in the movement by
civic leaders of the area north of downtown to create
their own authority, with a speciﬁc percentage of sales
tax revenue allocated to extend the construction of the
Blue Line to Pasadena. Also, the passage of a countywide proposition in 1998 to prohibit expenditures on
construction extending the newly completed 18-mile
subway can be seen as compensation for past overappropriations, though at the expense of promised
projects.
The case of the Alameda Corridor demonstrates the
successful linkage of appropriations and sanctions.
The seminal event of the ACTA case—the forcible
removal of the six mid-corridor cities—directly addressed the problem of overcommitment of resources
by parties that were not contributing resources. The
ACTA case demonstrates the evolution of mechanisms
that gave the appropriators, the ports and cities of
Los Angeles and Long Beach, direct control over the
appropriations. Removing the mid-corridor cities
removed votes for appropriations that would not
be paid for by those cities.
ACTA’s dependence on funding through bonds
backed only by the proceeds of future revenues eﬀectively guarded against the overcommitment of appropriations. Potential investors would have been scared
away by expenditures exceeding realistic projections of
revenue from freight charges for corridor use over the
next 30 years. This investor ﬂight would have necessitated higher interest rates in order to attract investment, in turn increasing repayment costs and driving
lifetime project costs even further beyond the reach of
revenue projections. Without limiting appropriations,

this upward spiral would have resulted in either a lack
of funds to start construction or a need for funding
from other agencies and a loss of project control by
the ports and cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach.
Project control and construction through bond
ﬁnancing linked the demand side of politics to
the supply side of resource allocation. The success of
the ACTA resulted from connecting both sides
of the equation.
Findings
Four major ﬁndings emerge from these case studies:
1. Terry Moe’s theory is supported in one respect:
Interest group politics lead to agency design that
structures conﬂict into the organizations. The cases
show that conﬂict is inevitable—not the accidental
by-product of insuﬃcient deliberation or the
absence of intelligent foresight.
2. One aspect of Terry Moe’s theory is not supported:
Out of the Hobbesian world of the politics of
structural choice, public agencies are not inevitable
failures. Though aﬀected by conﬂict and the other
baggage of political design, public agencies can
nonetheless evolve nested institutional solutions
that concurrently address political design problems.
3. Successful regional solutions are intensely local.
4. The California solution of solving allocation
dilemmas by importing more resources was a strategy employed to solve design problems in two of
the three agencies studied.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that conﬂict was a predictable
feature in each of these cases. The creation of the
LACTC intentionally placed the new agency in
conﬂict with the existing transit agency, the RTD,
and the existing regional planning agency, Southern
California Association of Governments. The MTA
intended to resolve conﬂict by merging the LACTC
and RTD, but it became mired in internal conﬂict
between two radically diﬀerent organizational cultures
and external conﬂict with funding agencies, areas
competing for new lines, and bus riders. The case
study of ACTA provides a vivid illustration of bitter
conﬂict between competing political jurisdictions: the
port cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach versus the
six mid-corridor cities. The ACTA case illustrates the
success of the supply-side California solution in solving the demand-side problems of conﬂict, as well as
the success of new mechanisms speciﬁc to local needs.
Each agency developed diﬀerent mechanisms to address the conﬂict inherent in its design. The LACTC
developed Proposition A to provide resources to competing interest groups: fare subsidies for bus riders,
transportation funding for local municipalities, rail
lines to every region in the Los Angeles County for
commuters, and a subway in downtown Los Angeles
for the business community. The MTA executive

director imposed a moratorium on new-start construction to abate internal conﬂicts between rail
builders and planners in the new agency and transit
operators, as well as external diﬀerences among the
various regions that wanted new rail starts, the bus
riders who wanted better bus service, and engineering
and construction ﬁrms that wanted more contracts.
Then–executive director Gill Hicks (2001) described a
process in which the ACTA eventually had to remove
the mid-corridor cities as voting members of the
authority in order to proceed.
The second ﬁnding that connects the cases is that
solutions were not linear in addressing one problem
after another sequentially. Rather, the mechanisms
evolved and responded simultaneously to several
conditions needed for cooperation, providing nested
solutions to problems. In the LACTC case, the
development of Proposition A addressed problems of
conﬂict by allocating resources to all competing constituencies, by responding to the problems of control
by not having a sunset provision typical of other sales
tax measures, and by acquiring authority through
local taxing powers.
The action of the executive director of the MTA in
imposing a new construction moratorium simultaneously responded to the conditions of accountability
and uncertainty while buying time to respond to
paralyzing internal and external conﬂicts. In the third
case study, the ACTA’s detailed memoranda of understanding with the mid-corridor cities addressed the
problems of conﬂict through the California solution
of directing new resources to competing interests.
The third ﬁnding related to each case involves local
adaptation mechanisms. Each case study exhibits
speciﬁc solutions that were unique to the context of
the newly created public agency. In addition, each
agency developed mechanisms speciﬁc to the region
and diﬀerent from similar agencies in the state of
California. In some cases, the mechanisms were novel
to transportation agencies in the United States. The
LACTC’s sales tax proposition lacked a sunset provision, unlike any other agency in the state. The MTA’s
moratorium was described by former executive director John Dyer (2001) as a nationally unique step, as
was the federal funding concept of minimal operating
segments inherited from the RTD. The third case
study of the ACTA demonstrates several solutions that
were speciﬁc to the Alameda Corridor project, including the use of design and build construction contracts
in the region. Also, the ACTA’s employment of user
fees and container fees leveraged federal funding and
guarantees needed for private investment in bonds
(Agarwal, Giuliano, and Redfearn 2004, 12).
The fourth ﬁnding from each case is the connection of
demand-side politics and supply-side cooperation to
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augment resources. The LACTC provided transportaand common-pool resource management—reduces
tion funds to each of the municipalities in the county, the set of variables that explain the governance perforfare subsidies to bus riders, and promises of rail lines
mance of each agency. The varied sets of results found
to nearly every neighborhood. The ACTA funded
in these case studies are anticipated and explained by a
sought-after projects in each of the mid-corridor
framework that synthesizes the major features found
cities, provided jobs to local residents, oﬀered contract in the politics of structural choice and common-pool
opportunities to local businesses,
resource research ﬁndings. This
and mitigated contaminated soil
combined framework identiﬁes
and water along the corridor.
the explanatory variables and
Credibility emerged as an imCredibility emerged as an imporportant consideration, not sim- provides a more robust frametant consideration, not simply in
work for understanding the
ply in an abstract sense but in
an abstract sense but in the ways
outcome variables.
the ways decision makers perdecision makers personally resonally related to each other.
lated to each other. Long-standA third implication is that a
Long-standing personal relaing personal relationships
focus on mechanisms moves well
characterized the interaction of
tionships characterized the in- beyond the study of organizaleading decision makers. In the
tional or governance structures,
teraction of leading decision
LACTC, the ﬁrst executive direcsuggesting that the structural
makers.
tor, Jerry Premo, who had previemphasis on consolidations by
ously worked at the U.S.
metropolitan government advoDepartment of Transportation, was
cates is an illusory solution. The
perceived as having credibility with funding agencies
consolidation of agencies in the MTA case study does
at both the federal and state levels. The credibility of
not show that consolidation solves preexisting conJulian Burke with the undersecretary of the U.S.
ﬂict. Conﬂict continued at the staﬀ level and with
Department of Transportation, Mort Downey, was an outside contractors, undermining the public’s percepimportant element in the MTA’s moratorium, as
tion of the agency. The level of animosity between the
Burke emphasized ﬁscal credibility with all funding
two agencies was not accounted for in the legislation
partners and the MTA’s board of directors. In the
that created the MTA. The complex politics of the
third case study of the ACTA, the long-standing proregion worked against solutions that did not provide
fessional credibility of the initial project director, Gill
resources to each of the competing interest groups and
Hicks, and the SCAG Director, Mark Pisano, with
subregions. Consequently, consolidation into a new
federal, state, and local partners contributed signiﬁorganizational structure was insuﬃcient to resolve
cantly to the emergence of cooperation.
conﬂict.
Implications of the Research
The untold story of the three public agencies studied
shows that conﬂict is endemic and that mechanisms
for cooperation are contextual. In short, history and
local circumstances provide both the sources of the
conﬂict that is inherent in politics and the sources of
the solutions that can evolve in order for cooperation
to emerge. The ﬁndings in these cases suggest that
regional governance is not a ﬂight from politics but an
evolution of mechanisms that respond to competing
interests. What determines the success or failure of
governance is not the presence of interest group
conﬂict but rather the mechanisms for cooperation
that evolve in the presence of that conﬂict.
A second implication is that the three cases empirically support the application of the combined
theories. The theories anticipate the types of problems
that dominate agency actions. The application of the
combined theories helps to explain how problems of
regional cooperation in a political environment are
solved or not solved in terms of the ﬁve proposed
features. Rather than producing an overwhelming set
of particulars, the combination of two distinct
research traditions—the politics of structural choice
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This combined framework helps to explain why savvy,
seasoned public managers with signiﬁcant political
acumen, such as John Dyer and Neil Peterson, are
eventually overtaken by the politics of the region. The
combined research framework also explains why new
executive directors and consolidated organizations do
not necessarily produce better cooperation. More than
taxonomy, the synthesized framework anticipates the
leadership challenges that must be addressed in a
political environment in order for cooperation to
emerge across political jurisdictions. The ﬁndings here
suggest that the leadership challenges of executive
directors in newly designed public agencies require
not only interpersonal and organizational-level leadership skills but also the ability to negotiate at the
institutional level. The agencies’ success at securing
local and federal funding for each of the projects
reﬂects both horizontal and vertical leadership skill
sets—critical for negotiating among competing
jurisdictions, on one hand, and among the public,
regional agencies, the state, and the federal government, on the other hand. In addition, the ACTA
case suggests the need for intersectoral skills to leverage public monies in order to attract private sector
capital.

Future Research
The use of institutional analysis in the three case
studies shows the potential of expanding the concepts
and terminology developed in the research on public
agency design to explain the impact of political design
on new governance approaches. The case studies also
show the potential of applying the research on the
evolution of mechanisms for cooperation to regional
governance challenges. Although not always found in
the study of governance, the mechanisms that evolved
are key to explaining what occurred in these cases.
Future research should apply the four conditions
found in these three case studies in a larger empirical
test. Research needs to move beyond one region and
one ﬁeld to test the hypotheses in diﬀerent geographic
locations, diﬀerent policy domains, and smaller agencies, as well as large-scale agencies. The suggestion of a
“California solution”—adding more resources to solve
the demand-side competition of politics in governance—
should be researched in other geographic regions,
testing supply-side solutions in promoting cooperation across competing local jurisdictions. Also, the
data collection could be expanded to include more
comprehensive surveys of key decision makers.
Additional research could be done by testing the four
conditions for cooperation across a variety of singlepurpose and multipurpose regional governance
agencies and councils of governments, as well as
newly designed federal agencies.
Future research also could focus on public managers
in these politically charged environments—speciﬁcally, how they navigate and negotiate newly and
deliberately designed institutional constraints. Questions about the leadership skills needed in these environments provide a new way of framing leadership
research, moving beyond endless contingency theory,
with its countless maps and categories of leadership
skills needed in the public sector.

through a variety of mechanisms. Varied new mechanisms were developed for each project.
The framework applied in the study of these cases
eﬀectively anticipated the types of problems each
agency had to overcome. In eﬀect, the framework
anticipated the limits of political design and the
potential for cooperation to evolve through the development of certain features. The utility of these
theories in anticipating the wide range of successes
and failures proved an exciting feature of the research.
Rather than a collection of inexplicable events, the
framework provided a useful focus on variables that
could explain the emergence of cooperation in a
political environment. Rather than random occurrences, the actions of each of the agencies responded
to the limits that the politics of design placed on
them. The evolution of cooperative mechanisms that
solved the problems of politics explained an important part of the performance of each agency.
When drawing future rail lines on a cocktail napkin at
dinner in downtown Los Angeles in 1978, the participants could not have anticipated the governance
challenges that would unfold over the next two decades. But their bold invitation to build a regional rail
system initiated an opportunity to develop regional
governance mechanisms to address the realities of
politics. The three cases illustrate the complexities of
politics and the challenges of cooperation in political
contexts. The evolution of the cases shows the importance of the local context and the possibility of the
evolution of unique adaptations. The presence of
conﬂict did not forestall the emergence of varied
governance solutions to address the cooperation
needed to work across political jurisdictions. The cases
suggest that even though public agencies may not be
designed to be eﬀective—
politics inevitably entails conﬂict—cooperation can
nonetheless emerge and evolve. The limits of politics
are not random or predestined. Likewise, the
emergence of sustainable governance is neither random nor preordained.

Conclusion
The three cases oﬀer a rich portrait of the dynamic
features of American politics and
Acknowledgments
the evolution of mechanisms for
Thank you to Yan Tang, Ross
cooperation. The forces that were
The forces that were present
Clayton, and Kevin Starr for
present when each agency was
when each agency was created their suggestions and review, and
created continued to shape their
evolution. Their initial design,
continued to shape their evolu- to the three anonymous
however, was not their destiny.
tion. Their initial design, how- reviewers.
For each agency, seminal events
ever, was not their destiny.
References
shaped the evolution of the
Agarwal, Ajay, Genevieve
multibillion-dollar projects they
Giuliano, and Christian
were charged with building. The
Redfearn. 2004. The Alameda Corridor: A White
success of the LACTC in Proposition A became a
Paper. Los Angeles: Metrans Transportation
source of expectations that were not met. The MTA
Center/USC Keston Institute for Infrastructure.
faced a level of expectation that had to be reshaped
www.metrans.org/pdfs/AlamedaCorridorWhite
through a moratorium. The ACTA’s evolution solved
Paper.pdf [accessed January 30, 2007].
the varied conditions needed for eﬀective cooperation
The Collision of Politics and Cooperation 299

Blomquist, William A. 1992. Dividing the Waters:
Governing Groundwater in Southern California.
San Francisco: ICS Press.
Burke, Julian. 2001. Interview with the author, June
26, Los Angeles.
California Transportation Commission. 1999. Annual
Report for the Year of 1998. Sacramento: California
Transportation Commission.
Carlsson, Lars. 2000. Policy Networks as Collective
Action. Policy Studies Journal 28(3): 502–20.
Clingermayer, James C., and Richard C. Feiock.
2001. Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice:
An Exploration of Local Governance. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
De la Cruz, Ralph. 2001. Interview with the author,
January 10, Los Angeles.
Downey, Mortimer. 2001. Interview with the author,
March 13, Newark, NJ.
Dyer, John. 2001. Interview with the author, May 17,
Los Angeles.
Edelman, Edmund D. 2001. Interview with the
author, February 5, Santa Monica, CA.
Feiock, Richard C. 2004. Introduction: Regionalism

Neglected Side of the Story. Special issue, Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organizations 6: 213–53.
———. 1990b. The Politics of Structural Choice:
Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In
Organizational Theory: From Chester Barnard tothe
Present and Beyond, edited by Oliver Williamson,
116–53. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1991. Politics and the Theory of
Organization. Special issue, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization 7: 106–29.
———. 1994. Integrating Politics and Organizations:
Positive Theory and Public Administration. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory 4(1): 17–25.
Ospina, Sonia M., and Jennifer Dodge. 2005. It’s
About Time: Catching Method Up to Meaning—
The Usefulness of Narrative Inquiry in Public
Administration Research. Public Administration
Review 65(2): 143–57.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The
Evolution for Collective Action. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
———. 1998. The Comparative Study of Public

and Institutional Collective Action. In Metropolitan

Economies. American Economist 42(1): 3–17.

Governance: Conﬂict, Competition, and Cooperation,

Peterson, Neil. 2001. Interview with the author,

edited by Richard C. Feiock, 3–17. Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press.
Heinrich, Carolyn J., Carolyn J. Hill, and Laurence
E. Lynn, Jr. 2004. Governance as an Organizing
Theme for Empirical Research. In The Art of
Governance: Analyzing Management and
Administration, edited by Patricia W. Ingraham and
Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., 3–19. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press.
Hicks, Gill. 2001. Interview with the author, June 25,
Paciﬁc Palisades, CA.
Hill, Carolyn J., and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. 2005.
Is Hierarchical Governance in Decline?
Evidence from Empirical Research. Journal of
Public Administration Research and Theory
15(2): 173–95.
Holen, Marvin. 1997. Interview with the author,
Los Angeles.
Katz, Richard. 2000. Interview with the author,
September 28, Sacramento, CA.
March, James G. 1997. Administrative
Practice, Organizational Theory, and Political

February 1, Los Angeles.
Pisano, Mark. 2001. Interview with the author,
February 5, Los Angeles.
Remy, Ray. 1998. Interview with the author, October
20, Sacramento, CA.
Richmond, Rick. 2000. Interview with the author,
December 4, Irwindale, CA.
Rubin, Thomas A., James E. Moore, and Shin Lee.
1999. Ten Myths about U.S. Urban Rail Systems.
Transport Policy 6(1): 57–73.
Schlager, Edella, and William Blomquist. 1996. A
Comparison of Three Emerging Theories of the
Policy Process. Political Research Quarterly 49(3):
651–72.
Scott, W. Richard. 1995. Institutions and
Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1986. Institutional Equilibrium
and Equilibrium Institutions. In Political Science:
The Science of Politics, edited by Herbert
F. Weisberg, 51–81. New York: Agathon Press.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1995.

Philosophy: Ruminations on the Reﬂections of

Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions.

John M. Gaus. PS: Policy Science and Politics 30(4):

In Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions,

689–99.

edited by Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry

McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R.
Weingast. 1989. Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies. Virginia Law Review 75(2):
431–82.
Miller, Gary. 2000. Above Politics: Credible
Commitment and Eﬃciency in the Design of

300

Moe, Terry M. 1990a. Political Institutions: The

R. Weingast, 5–35. Ann Arbor: University
Michigan Press.
Smith, D. J. 2000. Interview with the author,
December 18, Sacramento, CA.
Starr, Kevin. 2004. Coast of Dreams: California on the
Edge, 1990–2003. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Tang, Shui Yan. 1992. Institutions and Collective

Public Agencies. Journal of Public Administration

Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation. San Francisco:

Research and Theory 10(2): 289–327.

ICS Press.

Public Administration Review • March | April 2007

U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce. 1998. Surface
Infrastructure—Costs, Financing and Schedules
For Large-Dollar Transportation Projects.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Oﬃce.
GAO/RCED-98–64. www.gao.gov/archive/1998/
rc98064.pdf [accessed January 30, 2007].
Wilson, James Q. 1994. Reinventing Public
Administration. Political Science and Politics.
27(1): 667–73.

Yin, Robert K. 1994. Case Study Research: Designs and
Methods. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Young, Caprice. 2001. Interview with the
author, February 5, Santa Monica, CA.
Zegart, Amy Beth. 1996. In Whose Interest?
The Making of American National
Security Agencies. PhD diss., Stanford
University.

We Invite Your Feedback
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Sciences Center, 1380 Lawrence Street, Suite 500, Denver, CO 80204.
Selected letters will be reproduced in future issues!
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